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Hidehiko Takahashi1,2,3Over the past decade, neuroeconomics studies utilizing
neurophysiology methods (fMRI or EEG) have flourished,
revealing the neural basis of ‘boundedly rational’ or ‘irrational’
decision-making that violates normative theory. The next
question is how modulatory neurotransmission is involved in
these central processes. Here I focused on recent efforts to
understand how central monoamine transmission is related to
nonlinear probability weighting and loss aversion, central
features of prospect theory, which is a leading alternative to
normative theory for decision-making under risk.
Circumstantial evidence suggests that dopamine tonemight be
related to distortion of subjective reward probability and
noradrenaline and serotonin tone might influence aversive
emotional reaction to potential loss.
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Introduction
Should I take an umbrella with me this morning? Should I
buy life insurance? To answer these questions, and
choose, we need to estimate the probability of the
possible outcomes and magnitudes of possible gain and
loss. For instance, we need to take into account the
possible damage due to a severe health problem, the
insurance premium, and the probability of being involved
in a serious health problem.
Normative theory in decision-making under risks assumes
that people combine probabilities and valuation (utility) of
possible outcomes in someway,most typically by taking the
probability-weighted expectation over possible utilities.
While this expected utility theory is the dominant model,
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2012, 22:1062–1067experimental and field studies have repeatedly shown that
decision-makers systematically violate it [1]. Over the past
decade, a synthesis of economics and neuroscience called
neuroeconomics utilizing neurophysiology methods (fMRI
or EEG) has flourished, revealing the neural basis of
‘boundedly rational’ or ‘irrational’ decision-making that
violates normative theory. Past neuroeconomics studies
have demonstrated that, in addition to cortical regions such
as the prefrontal cortex (PFC), subcortical emotion-related
brain structures play a major role in ‘irrational’ decision-
making [2]. The next question is how modulatory neuro-
transmission is involved in these central processes [3,4].
Here, I provide an overview of recent efforts to understand
the neurochemical basis of ‘irrational’ decision-making
under risks especially with regard to prospect theory.
Nonlinear probability weighting
One type of systematic departure from normative
economic theory is that subjective weights on probabil-
ities appear to be nonlinear. Decision-makers often over-
estimate low probabilities (e.g. playing lotteries) and
underestimate high probabilities. A leading alternative
to the expected utility theory is the prospect theory [5], a
central feature of which is nonlinear probability weight-
ing. Objective probabilities, p, are transformed nonli-
nearly into decision weights w( p) by a weighting
function (Figure 1a). Experimental studies suggest that
the weighting function is regressive, asymmetric, and
inverse S-shaped, crossing the diagonal from above at
an inflection point (around 1/3) where p = w( p). Although
several functions have been proposed to express non-
linear probability weighting, the one-parameter function
derived axiomatically by Prelec [6], w( p) = exp{(ln(1/
p))a} with 0  a  1, is widely used because it typically
fits as well as other functions with one or two parameters
[7]. And because nonlinearity is fully captured by a single
parameter, it is simple to correlate the degree of non-
linearity (a) across individuals with biological measures
such as receptor density. This w( p) function has an
inverted-S shape with a fixed inflection point at p = 1/
e = 0.37 (at this point the probability 1/e also receives
decision weight 1/e). In an inverse S-shaped nonlinear
weighting function, low probabilities are overweighted
and moderate to high probabilities are underweighted.
The function neatly explains the typically observed pat-
tern of risk-seeking for low probability gain and risk
aversion toward high probability gain.
Paulus and Frank [8] investigated the neural substrates
that are related to nonlinear probability transformation
using fMRI with a certainty equivalent procedure.
During this procedure, a gamble’s certainty equivalent,www.sciencedirect.com
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Hypothesized model showing the contribution of central monoamine tone to violation of normative decision theory. (a) DA tone might play a central role
in distorting probability weighting function nonlinearly. Excessive DA tone might cause exaggerated overestimation of low probability and
underestimation of moderate to high probabilities. A smaller value of a (closer to 0) means a more nonlinear inflected weighting function and a higher
value (closer to 1) means a more linear weighting function. At a = 1 the function is linear. Therefore, excessive DA tone is related to smaller a. (b) 5-HT
and NE might contribute to shaping the slope of value function for loss. 5-HT might ease the slope of value function for loss (loss tolerance: green), and
NE might intensify the slope (loss aversion: red). The value function is usually assumed to be a power function v(x) = xs, but we used common
simplifying assumptions that s is 1 for both value functions in gain and loss domain. The ratio (loss/gain) of the slope of linear functions was determined
as l.the amount of sure payoff at which a player is indifferent
between the sure payoff and the gamble, was determined.
The authors found that differential anterior cingulate
activation during estimation of high probabilities relative
to low probabilities was positively correlated with Prelec’s
nonlinearity parameter a across subjects. Another fMRI
study with risks of electric shocks found similar nonlinear
response in brain regions including the caudate/subgen-
ual anterior cingulate [9]. Tobler et al. [10] reported that
the dorsolateral PFC was involved in overweighting low
probabilities and underweighting high probabilities, and
that the ventral frontal regions showed the opposite
pattern. More recently, Hsu et al. [7] reported that the
degree of nonlinearity in the neural response to anticip-
ated reward in the striatum reflected the nonlinearity
parameter as estimated behaviorally. The discrepancies
regarding the loci of activation are thought to stem from
differences in the task (probability range, context, etc.)
and analysis of parameter estimation. However, it is
reasonable to investigate the relationship between the
dopamine (DA) system and nonlinear probability weight-
ing, considering the fact that DA is linked to risk-seeking
behavior [11] and excessive DA release was observed in
pathological gambling in Parkinson’s disease patients
[12]. Trepel et al. [4] hypothesized in a thoughtful review
that DA transmission in the striatummight be involved in
shaping probability weighting. In order to test this specu-
lation, we utilized in vivo molecular neuroimaging bywww.sciencedirect.compositron emission tomography (PET) to examine central
DA transmission and nonlinear probability weighting.
Certainty equivalents were determined outside the PET
scanner, and we estimated probability weighting using
the Prelec’s one-parameter function [6].
Thefindingwas that striatalD1 receptor bindingmeasured
by [11C]SCH23390 PET (but not D2 receptor binding
measured by [11C]raclopride PET) was correlated with
the nonlinearity parameter a of weighting function
(Figure 2) [13]. That is, people with lower striatal D1
receptor binding tend to show more pronounced over-
estimation of low probabilities and underestimation of
high probabilities. [11C]SCH23390 is a selective radioli-
gand for D1 receptors, but it also has some affinity for
serotonin (5-HT) 2A receptors. 5HT2A receptor density in
the striatum is negligible compared toD1 receptor density.
However, 5HT2A receptor density is never negligible in
extrastriatal regions, anda recent in vivo study reported that
approximately one-fourth of the cortical signal of
[11C]SCH23390 was due to binding to 5HT2A receptors
[14]. The role of extrastriatal D1 receptors in nonlinear
weighting needs to be tested with a more selective radi-
oligand in future studies.
Although nonlinear probability weighting is a combi-
nation of risk-seeking (overestimation of low probability)
and risk-aversion (underestimation of high probability), inCurrent Opinion in Neurobiology 2012, 22:1062–1067
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Relationship between striatal DA D1 receptors and nonlinear probability transformation. (a) Parametric image of DA D1 receptor binding potential
measured by [11C]SCH23390 is shown. (b) Positive correlation between striatal D1 receptor binding and a of the weighting function is shown. Panels
were taken and modified from [13].a clinical setting, the excessive overestimation of low
probability of winning a gamble might be more proble-
matic. Clinical studies have reported the emergence of
pathological gambling in Parkinson’s disease patients
taking DA agonist medication [15,16], and such patients
demonstrated enhanced DA release in the ventral stria-
tum measured by [11C]raclopride PET during gambling
[12]. Although pathological gambling is a complex beha-
vior and cannot be solely attributed to mis-estimating
probability, these observations can lead to the conjecture
that excessive DA transmission might cause distortion of
subjective reward probability (Figure 1a). From a psycho-
logical point of view, the overweighting of low-probability
gains may reflect the hope of winning, and it is straight-
forward to link DA tone and overweighting of low prob-
ability. Underweighting of high-probability gains may
reflect the fear of losing a ‘near sure thing’. In addition
to DA [17,18], 5-HT [17] and NE [19] are also known to
modulate the emotional reaction of fear, and the shape of
weighting function in the high-probability portion should
be determined by multiple neurotransmitters other than
DA.
Loss aversion
Pain derived from losing a certain amount of money
appears to be greater than the pleasure derived from
gaining the same amount. Imagine having a chance to
participate in a coin flip game of chance. Using a fair coin,
if the result is heads, you will win $100, and if the result is
tails, you will lose $100. Are you willing to participate in
this gamble? Typically, most people would say ‘no’. Well,
how about the following gamble? If the result is heads,
you will win $200, and if the result is tails, you will loseCurrent Opinion in Neurobiology 2012, 22:1062–1067$100. In this case, some people would say ‘yes’. This
means that, typically, losses have at least twice the impact
of equivalent gains, a property called loss aversion [20].
Many laboratory and field studies have found evidence in
monkeys for food rewards, and in humans for financial
outcomes, features of consumer goods, food rewards,
game show winnings, and apartment sales [1,21,22]. In
prospect theory, this is modeled by a value function of
losses that is steeper than that of gains (Figure 1b).
A recent fMRI study has shown that the PFC and
striatum are involved in loss aversion [23]. Brain lesion
studies have reported that amygdala lesion patients
showed diminished loss aversion [24]. Sokol-Hessner
et al. [25] described that physiological arousal response
(skin conductance response) to losses was greater than to
equivalent gains on average. This means that losses are
more emotionally laden and salient than equivalent gains.
The study also reported that individuals with greater
arousal response to losses versus gains tend to be more
loss-aversive. More recently, the same authors, using
fMRI, revealed that behavioral loss aversion was corre-
lated with amygdala activity in response to losses relative
to gains [26].
It is widely acknowledged that 5-HT plays a major role in
emotional response or affective state. Although there are
no PET studies on the relationship between 5-HT trans-
mission and loss aversion, circumstantial evidence
suggests that central 5-HT tone might be associated with
loss aversion. Enhancing 5-HT transmission by trypto-
phan supplement reduced the ‘reflection effect’ [27].
‘Reflection effect’ refers to the fact that decision-makerswww.sciencedirect.com
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win $100 or no gain at all, showing risk-aversion. However,
decision-makers tend to prefer a 50/50 gamble to lose $100
or no loss at all to the guaranteed $50 loss, showing risk-
seeking. ‘Reflection effect’ and ‘framing effect’ can be
partially explained using loss aversion. De Martino et al.
[28] reported that susceptibility to the framing effect was
associated with amygdala activation. Then they reported
that genetic variation in the promoter region of the 5-HT
transporter gene (5-HTTTLPR) predicted the suscepti-
bility to the framing effect. Homozygosity for s allele
showed greater amygdala activation during decision-mak-
ing and stronger framing effect than l carriers [29]. More
recently, large-sample behavioral economics studies in a
Chinese sample also showed that homozygosity for s allele
showedhigher loss aversion than l carriers [30]. It is difficult
to estimate pre-and post-synaptic (and net) 5-HT trans-
mission by genetic variation in 5-HTTTLPR [31], but 5-
HT neurotransmission seems to ease the aversion to
financial loss (Figure 1b).
In addition to 5-HT, a line of evidence suggests that
norepinephrine (NE) might be involved in loss aversion.
The role of NE in arousal is well established [32], and
physiological arousal response was reported to be associ-
ated with behavioral loss aversion [25]. Central NE
blockade by propranolol attenuated the sensitivity to the
magnitude of possible losses at gambles [33]. Lack of
appropriate PET radioligand has prevented us from inves-
tigating the role of central NE transmission in cognition,
emotion anddecision-making in vivo. However, (S,S)-18F-
FMeNER-D2 has recently been developed as a radioli-
gand for the measurement of norepinephrine transporter
for PET [34,35]. (S,S)-18F-FMeNER-D2 is a reboxetine
analog and has high affinity and high selectivity forFigure 3
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Relationship between thalamic NET and loss aversion. (a) Average of spatial
Negative correlation between thalamic NET binding and l is shown. Panels
www.sciencedirect.comnorepinephrine transporter. We utilized positron emission
tomography (PET) scans with (S,S)-[18F]FMeNER-D2 to
investigate the relationship between central NET and loss
aversion [36]. A NET-rich region available to PET ima-
ging with this ligand is the thalamus. The amygdala and
PFC are also innervated by NE, but the relatively low
expression of NET prevented reliable measurement of
their NET binding.
Loss aversion parameters were determined outside the
PET scanner using a 50:50mixed gamble (gain–loss). This
parameter l is similar to the parameter in prospect theory
butmakes the common simplifying assumptions of a linear
rather than curvilinear value function (Figure 1b), and
identical decision weights for a 0.5 probability of a gain
or loss. The finding was that there was a negative corre-
lation between l and NET binding in the thalamus
(Figure 3). That is, individuals with low thalamic NET
tend to show pronounced loss aversion. Although NE has
been implicated in arousal, recent studies also suggest that
NE affects processing of salient information [32]. Neurons
of the locus coeruleus (LC), the major source of NE in the
brain, are phasically evoked by salient or emotional stimuli
[37], and phasic LC activation also increases NE release in
target sites [32]. Increasing NE tone by NE reuptake
inhibitor improves detection of emotional stimuli [38],
and blockade of central NE by propranolol predominantly
impairs processing of negatively emotional stimuli [39].
Thus, PET findings suggest that individuals with low
NET in the thalamus might show enhanced effect of
NE released by salient stimuli due to low re-uptake,
and consequently show pronounced emotional or arousal
response to losses relative to gains. Thalamic NET might
be an indirect mediator of the relationship between NE
transmission and loss aversion. Similarly to 5-HT systems,0.4 0.5 0.6
NET binding in the thalamus
0.7 0.8
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ly normalized summed PET image of (S,S)-[18F]FMeNER-D2 is shown. (b)
were taken and modified from [36].
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1066 Decision makingRasch et al. [40] reported that a genetic variation of
ADRA2B, the gene encoding the a2b-adrenergic receptor,
predicted the amygdala responsivity to negative emotional
stimuli. Future studieswith amore appropriate radioligand
for measuring NET in the amygdala and PFC, which are
innervated by NE and implicated in loss aversion, are
recommended. For the present, it is not unreasonable to
suppose that central NE tone contributes to shaping the
slope of the value function in the loss domain (Figure 1).
Recently, Preuschoff et al. [41] investigated the relation-
ship between pupil dilation and surprise associated with
decision outcome. Surprise was defined as the difference
between predicted outcome and actual outcome. Although
skin conductance response or pupil dilation is a peripheral
response, several lines of evidence support the concept of a
link between these peripheral responses and the central
NE level [42]. Compared to theDA system, the role of the
NE system in reward processing has been less studied, and
specifically, the research field that would elucidate the role
of NE in ‘emotional’ or ‘irrational’ decision-making under
risk is worthy of further development.
Conclusion
The PET technique is a powerful tool for investigating
the relationship between neurotransmitters and decision-
making in vivo in human. However, standard PET studies
tell us only the correlational relationship. Complementary
pharmacological studies as well as animal studies are
needed for a full understanding of the causal relationship.
Mis-estimating risk could lead to disadvantaged choices
such as initiation of drug use/gambling and transition to
regular drug use/gambling [43]. An interdisciplinary
approach combing molecular imaging techniques and
cognitive neuroscience and clinical psychiatry will pro-
vide new perspectives for understanding the neurobiol-
ogy of impaired decision-making in neuropsychiatric
disorders and their drug development [44].
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